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Few if any contemporary public economists of note laud the virtue of tax incentives. On the 
contrary, the general line is to warn against them. Bird (2008: 9) states as follows: “Despite 
their continuing popularity almost everywhere, tax incentives are usually redundant and 
ineffective: they reduce and complicate the fiscal system without achieving their stated 
objectives. Even to the limited extent that some incentives are effective in inducing investors 
to behave differently than they would have done in response to market signals, the result is 
often inefficient, diverting scarce resources into less than optimal uses.” Zee, Stotsky and Ley 
(2002: 1497) observe that the use of tax incentives is widespread even though the available 
empirical evidence on the cost-effectiveness of such incentives in stimulating investment is 
highly inconclusive. An FIAS (2001) report on incentives in Indonesia finds little evidence of 
success in luring investment via incentives—at least without very high costs.  
There is evidence to the contrary as well. Incentives aimed explicitly at increasing foreign 
direct investment are used throughout the world. And there is some evidence of their 
impact. De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) find that the elasticity of foreign direct capital stock 
with respect to changes in the cost of capital is greater than one in developed countries. 
Klemm and Van Parys (2009) make a distinction between tax rate differentials and other 
incentives and find that the latter have some impact on investment but they do not conclude 
that they have a discernable impact on economic growth. 
No matter the evidence, tax incentives continue to drive much of the tax policy in developing 
and developed countries and there are myriad examples. Competitive tax incentives 
between countries in a region are often the order of the day (Keen & Mansour, 2009). For 
example: tax incentives are a central part of Rwanda’s economic development plan (UNCTAD 
2006; FIAS 2006a); in April 2011 Uganda’s tax exemptions led the IMF to call for their 
elimination to broaden tax bases (IMF, 2011); and South Africa has a substantial number of 
incentives that reach manufacturing, tourism, and mining among other industries (FIAS, 
2006b; IMF, 2008; Deloitte, 2009). Even within countries, such as the U.S., states 
(subnational governments) find themselves “at war” with one another over the attraction of 
businesses through incentives (for a practical example, see Wisconsin Legislative Reference 
Bureau, 2006). 
While the impact of tax incentives on economic growth has been the focus of a large amount 
of theoretical and empirical research in developed nations, the question of their impact 
remains elusive. In developing nations, the empirical evidence of the impact of tax incentives 
is growing but the answers are at least as, if not more, elusive. The dearth of evidence is 
particularly troublesome when these countries experiment with a wide variety of incentives. 
What are the goals of these incentives? Are these incentives effective? Are there 
distributional implications of incentives that may be counterproductive or enhance first 
round impacts? What is the cost-benefit associated with their use? How can we evaluate 
them? 
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The purpose of this paper is, very generally, to provide a framework and potential 
methodology of analysis of tax incentives in one country — South Africa. As incentives are 
often specific and targeted, the precise methods needed to analyze the effectiveness of 
incentives may well differ among types of incentives. However, by positing a framework for 
evaluation based on basic economic principles, we believe that transparency, accountability 
and rigorous evaluation of individual incentives or regarding the choice of incentives may be 
enhanced.  
We choose the case of South Africa as one where tax incentives have been widely used and 
for which data are more readily available than in many other sub-Saharan African countries. 
Our focus is on developing a reasonable way to identify and classify incentives so as to 
reduce the apples-to-oranges comparison syndrome (which may provide cover for a lack of 
analysis), positing a hierarchy of incentives based on their likely efficiency enhancing (or 
efficiency diminishing) properties, and providing a means to evaluate the potential 
macroeconomic effectiveness of these policies up front, which also provides a means to 
evaluate the policies ex post. The importance of establishing evidence for policies such as tax 
incentives cannot be overstated – too often policies march forward with little consideration 
of the cost-benefit and opportunity cost of specific policy interventions. Using known tools 
including Input-Output (Supply-Use) tables and analysis, Social Accounting Matrices, and 
resulting multipliers and relying on previous research, we provide a framework to compare 
alternative incentives ex ante. These tools are also used in computable general equilibrium 
models, but we suggest that full blown CGE models may not be the most transparent tool to 
evaluate the subtleties of targeted tax incentives, which many countries use. CGE models are 
becoming increasingly detailed and disaggregated, but often do not incorporate the sector 
specificity found in I-O models.   
Section 1 raises definitional issues and summarizes economic effects of a variety of tax 
incentives. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature. In Section 3 a classification is 
presented of tax incentives as instruments to promote direct fixed investment, with 
reference to differences of acceptability and incidence in South Africa. In Section 4 we 
estimate the effect of tax incentives, and section 5 considers alternatives to tax incentives. 
Section 6 concludes. 
1. Economics of Tax Incentives 
 
Tax incentives come in many forms. Incentives may relieve tax liabilities completely (tax 
holidays), partially, provide preferred rates, deductions, exemptions and may fall on one tax 
or many. Incentives are given by central governments as well as subnational governments. 
Incentives may be very localized with the expectation of generating investment in one region 
of a country or may be developed with the expectation of increasing investment (foreign and 
domestic) at large. In section 3 below, we present a means of categorizing incentives. 
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Whatever the form of tax incentive, the economics are relatively straightforward. In the case 
of incentives focused on investment (many of the incentives employed through the 
corporate income tax or taxes on capital income), the user cost of capital concept (UCC) (the 
price of capital) demonstrates that tax incentives may work to reduce the cost of capital 
directly or indirectly, thereby increasing investment. The precise definition of the UCC is 
affected by the level of detail, but a basic construct is that found in Hall and Jorgensen 
(1967): 
          q = purchase price of 1 unit of K 
          δ = proportionate depreciation rate of K 
     q*δ = depreciation in one period for K worth q per unit 
          r = cost of financing per dollar of financing 
     q*r = cost of financing per unit of K 
     -Δq = change in value of capital (loss) 
   UCC = q (r + δ – g) where g = Δq /q  
Profits are maximized when capital is hired to the point that the value of the marginal 
product of capital (P*MPk) is equal to the user cost. Factors such as tax rates, depreciation 
and treatment of capital gains, tax holidays, and subsidized interest rates affect the UCC and 
thereby the level of investment. A similar model might be derived for labor which 
demonstrates that tax incentives aimed at reducing the cost of labor would potentially 
increase hiring. 
Other incentives could reduce other variable costs such as transportation, thus reducing the 
marginal cost of production. Again, under such a scenario, a profit maximizing firm would 
then be able to increase the amount of output. Some incentives reduce fixed costs including 
the costs of doing business (licensing, permitting, making tax payments, etc.). A reduction of 
these costs may reduce the threshold for new firms entering and thereby expand investment 
and production. 
 
These stylized models are admittedly simple, but demonstrate the potential impact of tax 
incentives and the notion that they can be modeled within a relatively standard market 
framework. In the “real world” complications arise due to competing policies, substitutability 
between capital and other inputs, impact of long-term incentives, competition from other 
countries, etc. Besides, the economic incidence differs from the statutory incidence. These 
complications can mitigate or exacerbate the impact of incentives in any one country.  
 
We submit that, if the incentive is substantial, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
approach may be used to analyze the potential impact. There is no golden rule regarding 
 The Impact of Tax Incentives to Stimulate Investment in South Africa  5 
 
 
 
when a CGE model is an appropriate tool of analysis, but many tax incentives are small 
relative to the size of the economy and in many cases, CGE models will not include detailed 
sectors and or administrative detail to deal with specific incentives. This is not true in the 
case of broad incentives including a reduction in the corporate income tax. 
 
Many countries target tax incentives to a specific industry as a means to develop new 
industries or revive older industries. As a result, in the short run, the UCC in one industry 
may be heavily subsidized by tax increases in other industries (or on other factors), creating 
a competitive advantage in the short run. Depending on the mobility of factors of 
production, we would expect that the net rates of return to all factors would eventually 
equilibrate or tend to converge. As a result, the competitive advantage of the original 
incentive may be mitigated (or enhanced) depending on the structure of the economy, 
factor mobility and substitution and the like, a la Harberger’s general equilibrium corporate 
tax incidence analysis. 
2. Views on tax incentives 
We distinguish between general and selective investment tax incentives. General tax 
incentives refer to incentives applying across the board, and with no exception, to all tax 
payers, such as a reduction in the corporate tax rate or universal depreciation allowances. 
Selective investment tax incentives is defined as a selective deviation from the benchmark 
tax, i.e. the standard tax provision as legislated and which is suspended or changed to 
benefit a select group of taxpayers. Along with Zee, Stotsky and Ley (2002: 1498) we 
distinguish, with reference to investment, between a statutory and an economic tax 
incentive. The former is defined as “a special tax provision granted to qualified investment 
projects (however determined) that represents a statutorily favorable deviation from a 
corresponding provision applicable to investment projects in general (i.e. projects that 
receive no special tax provision).” The latter is defined as “a special tax provision granted to 
qualified investment projects that has the effect of lowering the effective tax burden – 
measured in some way – on those projects, relative to the effective tax burden that would 
be borne by the investors in the absence of the special tax provision.” Together, general and 
special tax incentives represent total tax expenditure, although a reduction in corporate tax 
rates would not be regarded as a tax expenditure.2 Our focus is on incentives focused on 
encouraging investment in the home country. The real impact depends on the economic and 
not the statutory incidence of the benefit. 
Tax incentives which are directed at business activities are aimed at real investment in 
productive activities rather than investment in financial assets and often directed to foreign 
investors. They are supposed to supplement insufficient domestic capital for the desired 
level of economic development in specific sectors or across the board. The accompanying 
modern technology and management techniques are viewed as an important side-benefit, 
                                                          
2
 For an outline of definitional issues, see OECD (2010). 
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and in some instances technology transfer is a key objective of incentives (United Nations, 
2000) – the positive externality argument. Developing and transition countries have 
introduced investment incentives for varying reasons. In some cases, especially in transition 
countries that have not reformed the socialist tax system, incentives were seen as 
counterweight to investment disincentives inherent in the general tax system. In other 
countries, they have been introduced to offset other disadvantages investors may face, e.g. 
lack of infrastructure, complicated and antiquated laws, bureaucratic complexities and weak 
administration in the area of tax or elsewhere. Sometimes they were introduced to keep up 
with other countries in competing for international investment, a kind of ‘race to the 
bottom’ in effective corporate tax rates. Although tax incentives might be justified as 
temporary measures until more deep-seated deficiencies have been removed, there are 
countries where such incentives were actually introduced or maintained even after 
deficiencies in law and administration had been remedied (Holland & Vann, 1998: 987). 
Why are many economists and fiscal authorities at best lukewarm about tax incentives?  
These incentives distort preferences and allocative efficiency. They are criticised because 
they imply that government officials are better able than private investors to decide the best 
types and means of production, which would be necessary if economic performance is to be 
improved. This amounts to a criticism of any ‘picking-winners’ industrial strategy. The 
criticism is also based on empirical evidence that the investment decision is determined by 
more than tax-related considerations, that is, nontax-related economic considerations, 
noneconomic considerations and social policy considerations. A first best approach would be 
to address impediments at source and not through tax incentives.3 Further, tax incentives 
create tax-driven businesses, which are not eventually economically sustainable. In fact, a 
vested interest is created in their perpetuation, which makes them very difficult to abolish. 
From a fiscal point of view, the real cost is hidden and the tax base is eroded. The growing 
call for tax expenditures budgets may be a reflection of the institutionalized nature of tax 
incentives and other changes in tax systems over the years. 
Often the non-transparent character of incentives facilitates tax evasion, complicates tax 
administration and encourages rent-seeking behaviour and corruption. Most incentives do 
not reach entities unless profit is made; companies with initial high layout cost do not qualify 
unless excess tax credits can be sold to profitable companies (a growing policy option in 
some industry incentives in the U.S.). Empirical research indicate that tax incentives can 
stimulate investment, but that a country’s overall economic characteristics may be more 
important for the success or the failure of industries than any tax incentives package (Zee, 
                                                          
3
 Supporters of tax incentives will often forward the argument of incubators for new businesses in which the 
barriers to entry are quite high due to technology, information, etc. In some cases, these market-failure 
barriers to entry may be mitigated by government supported research and development, regulations on 
monopolies, etc. Tax incentives to support specific industries are more of a blunt instrument that may also 
benefit other industries. In the end, the question remains – can the new industry be sustained without 
additional policy interference? 
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Stotsky & Ley, 2001:1509). Even if tax incentives stimulate investment, they are not generally 
cost effective. 
The limited usefulness of tax incentives derives also from the fact that investors often 
emphasize the relative unimportance of the tax system in investment decisions compared 
with other considerations (Holland & Vann, 1998: 987). Evidence is that firms first examine a 
country’s basic economic and institutional situation and are basically attracted to the 
potential markets in developing and transition countries and the relatively low-cost labour. 
Factors inhibiting large-scale investment and for which tax incentives can’t compensate 
include uncertainty in the policy stance of governments, political instability and the 
rudimentary state of the legal framework for a market economy (in transition economies). 
Tax incentives on their own cannot overcome these negative factors and the general 
features of the tax system (tax base, tax rates, stability, consistency/predictability, 
transparency, etc.) are more important than tax incentives. (Klemm & Van Parys, 2009; 
James, 2009; McKinsey Global Institute, 2003). 
Why do countries enact tax incentives despite their drawbacks? Legislators may feel the 
need to do something to attract investment but may find it difficult to address the chief 
reasons that discourage investment. Tax incentives are at least something over which they 
have control and which they can enact relatively easily and quickly, precisely because the full 
cost is not always visible or disclosed. Alternatives to tax incentives may also involve direct 
expenditure of funds, and tax incentives may be seen as a politically easier alternative, since 
subsidies involving direct expenditure may undergo closer scrutiny than tax expenditures 
aimed at attracting investment. In fact, few countries produce a regular tax expenditure 
budget that quantifies the value of incentives while direct expenditures are under scrutiny in 
any modern budgeting exercise. In addition, some countries may feel under pressure to 
provide “visible” incentives for multinational companies, who threaten to locate investment 
elsewhere if they are not given concessions. Incentives also provide a popular way for 
officials to show efforts to increase employment and incubate or otherwise support 
industries deemed important to the country. 
Many economists would admit, however, if pushed, that a market-failure case can be made 
for tax incentives to internalize positive externalities in a Pigouvian way. Examples are in 
respect of: projects located in less developed regions of a country (either to reduce 
congestion and/or pollution in the developed regions, or to reduce the disparity in income 
distribution that could be viewed as having some public-good characteristics); projects 
entailing use of advanced technologies that could raise the general technological absorption 
capacity of a country; projects that have a high propensity of leading to a build-up of key 
types of human capital whose benefits usually extend beyond the persons embodying them; 
and projects that involve research and development activities in targeted areas deemed 
important for whatever policy reasons. (see Zee, Stotsky & Ley, 2002: 1500). 
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3. Classification of tax incentives, with reference to South Africa 
In South Africa interest in tax expenditure (of which tax incentives form a subset) has flared 
up from time to time. Heyns (1984) listed 164 tax expenditures and the cost of some, arguing 
the case for a tax expenditure budget for South Africa. The Margo Commission (RSA, 1988: 
67-68) recommended the phasing out of various tax expenditures, some of which were 
indeed terminated even if with some delay (like the phasing out of the general export 
incentive scheme). The IMF’s (2008) Country Report on South Africa presents a 
comprehensive list of tax expenditures. The first time an official list of tax expenditures was 
published, was in the 2011 Budget Review (RSA, 2011: 181). South Africa has yet to publish a 
fully-fledged tax expenditure budget, however, and little – if any – aggregate analysis has 
been done on the impact of tax incentives.4 
Drawing on Zee, Stotsky and Ley (2002: 1502-1507), Table 1 contains a codified list of 
different types of tax incentives, as well as a brief statement regarding the acceptability (or 
unacceptability) of the different types of tax incentives from the point of view of allocative 
or tax efficiency and/or administrative feasibility.5 A tick (⥌) in the second column indicates 
that this type of incentive is currently applied in South Africa. 
Analysis of tax incentives should reflect an absolute analysis (is the incentive “good”?) as 
well as a relative analysis (is incentive X better than incentive Y?). The normative analysis of 
tax incentives consists of concerns over economic efficiency and equity. The welfare cost of 
incentives should be considered when contemplating and comparing incentives. Similarly, 
the equity implications are to be taken into account but may be difficult to do so. Tax 
incentives by their nature are revenue losers and should be offset with an increase in other 
revenue or a decrease in expenditures, unless of course the intent is to stealthily increase  
TABLE 1. TYPES OF TAX INCENTIVES 
 
Incentive type and 
use in SA 
Statement on acceptability 
Category 
code 
Direct tax incentives   
1. Corporate income tax (CIT) rate incentives  CITR 
1.1 Tax holidays 
 
 Bulk of revenue forgone is likely to have no beneficial impact 
on investment. Benefit-cost ratio is low. 
 Particularly susceptible to tax planning (i.e. avoidance 
schemes), including fictitious foreign-owned companies. 
 Not recommendable. 
CITR-TH 
1.2 Preferential CIT 
rates  
⥌ 
 Rules are complex and subject to manipulation. 
 Identifying the qualifying income is problematic. Income 
from both existing and new operations becomes eligible. It is 
less likely to be cost-effective than incentives related to the 
CITR-PR 
                                                          
4
There has been some analysis of the effectiveness of particular tax incentives, however, such as Flatters (2002) 
in respect of the motor industrial development programme (MIDP). 
5
When economists qua economists do not succeed in stemming the tide and dampening the political affinity for 
tax incentives, they still have a role to play, namely to advise on which tax incentives are the least unacceptable 
in the second- or third-best world. And sometimes they are listened to. 
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TABLE 1. TYPES OF TAX INCENTIVES 
 
Incentive type and 
use in SA 
Statement on acceptability 
Category 
code 
amount of new investment. 
 Not recommendable. 
2. Investment cost-recovery incentives ICR 
2.1 Investment 
allowances 
⥌ 
 Of greatest benefit to firms with income from existing 
operations, who can shelter a portion of their income from 
tax with the incentives earned on the new investment. 
 Firms with low income or start-up firms cannot begin to take 
advantage of the incentive until investment begins to earn 
taxable income. 
 Revenue impact in theory tied to the degree of new activity: 
relatively small in early years of program and grows over 
time as more firms become eligible. 
 Carry-forward of deductions by firms that cannot fully use 
them can considerably raise the revenue cost over time. 
 Meritorious. 
ICR-IA 
2.2 Investment tax 
credits 
⥌ 
 Can be manipulated, using subsidiary costing, to claim 
benefit for inefficient spending or cost (together with 
depreciation allowances) exceeding investment. 
ICR-ITC 
3. Accelerated 
depreciation 
⥌ 
 Incentive in form of accelerated depreciation. 
 Amount written off reduces future depreciation base, 
ensuring total amount written off cannot exceed the actual 
investment cost. 
 Has fewest of the shortcomings associated with CIT rate 
incentives and all of the virtues associated with investment 
cost-recovery. 
AD 
4. Investment 
subsidies 
 Can be in form of income tax relief and/or preferential tax 
rates on interest, dividends and capital gains 
 Least meritorious. 
IS 
Indirect incentives   
5. Export-oriented 
incentives (tariff or 
VAT exemptions) 
⥌ 
 Very prone to abuse, as qualified purchases can easily be 
diverted to buyers not intended to receive the incentives. 
 Duty draw-back schemes a better version. 
EO 
6. Export processing 
zones 
 Tax incentives available in these zones often comprise both 
indirect and direct taxes – latter often tend to attract 
economic activities unrelated to exports. 
EPZ 
 
the general tax burden. We do not attempt to do a full fiscal incidence analysis at this time 
and so we concentrate on the efficiency aspects of the tax incentives. 
Incentives may impact welfare, employment, and income over a short or long period. The 
longer the payback to an incentive, the lesser will be the net present benefit of that 
incentive. An exception might be when the tax incentive is supposed to internalize a social 
benefit, such as in the case of new technology, or addressing a structural bias against market 
entry (although the first-best solution would be to remove the structural barrier). A central 
question then becomes, what is the period of analysis? Incentive schemes are often 
designed to generate tax benefits on the basis of performance criteria, such as job creation, 
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generation of foreign exchange and decentralisation into particular regions (e.g. relocation 
of industry to rural areas to counter urbanisation or for some other politico-economic 
reason6). It is difficult to evaluate the efficiency of such types of incentives as one is required 
to value allocative efficiency as well as equity. 
Table 2 contains an illustrative matrix for South Africa, and includes a list of tax incentives (of 
the types indicated in Table 1 with ⥌), a category code and information on the type and 
nature of tax to which the incentive is linked, as well as the nature of, reasons for, estimated 
cost of the incentive (based here and there on some heroic assumptions, as outlined in 
Appendix A), and economic acceptability of the incentive. It should be noted that the 
introduction of a tax incentive often adds to the cost of administration. Admittedly, there are 
also cases where a tax allowance may well save administrative cost, for example exempting 
very small business from income tax. 
 
TABLE 2. TAX INCENTIVES PERTAINING TO MANUFACTURING IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2009 
 
Incentive 
Type/ 
Category  
Code 
Nature of Incentive 
Reasons for 
Incentive 
Acceptability of 
Incentive 
Other comments / 
assessment(s) 
Cost 
estimate 
(08/09), 
[2009 R m] 
Rebate on 
import 
duties in 
manufac-
ture for 
home con-
sumption or 
export 
EO 
Partial rebate or a rebate 
of the full duty on 
certain specified 
imported goods 
To stimulate 
local 
manufacture, 
to reduce input 
cost of locally 
manufactured 
goods which in 
turn allow local 
manufacturers 
to be more 
competitive in 
international 
trade 
Target winners; 
duty draw-back 
schemes a 
better version 
Beneficiaries in 
2008/09: light 
motor vehicles 
(MIDP) 
(R 5 635 m); 
heavy motor 
vehicles (R 942 
m); motor vehicle 
parts & 
accessories 
(R 594 m); textile 
(R 426 m); 
furniture & 
fixtures (R 128 m) 
14 241 
Special 
small 
business 
corporation 
tax 
structure 
CITR-PR 
Reduced rate of taxation 
and special tax regime - 
presumptive tax, 
enhanced depreciation 
regime, capital gains tax 
relief, relief from skills 
development levy, 
graduated scale: 
 Tax threshold: R 
59 750 
 Taxable income R 
59 751 - R300 000: 
10% of amount > R 
59 750 
Reduce the cost 
of compliance 
for small 
businesses and 
encourage 
expansion of 
small 
businesses 
Differential tax 
rates lead to 
perverse 
incentives to 
decompose 
larger entities 
into smaller 
ones;  may 
encourage non-
profitable small 
businesses to 
develop 
 No sunset 
clause 
 Stern & 
Barbour 
(2005) 
estimated 
METR for 
SMEs between 
22-32% 
(corporate 
rate then 
29%); higher 
than standard 
tax regime in 
675 
                                                          
6
An interesting example is Germany, where tax incentives are offered for industrial development in the area of 
the former DDR. 
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TABLE 2. TAX INCENTIVES PERTAINING TO MANUFACTURING IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2009 
 
Incentive 
Type/ 
Category  
Code 
Nature of Incentive 
Reasons for 
Incentive 
Acceptability of 
Incentive 
Other comments / 
assessment(s) 
Cost 
estimate 
(08/09), 
[2009 R m] 
 Taxable income ≥R 
300 001: R24 025 (plus 
28% of amount > R300 
000) 
formal sectors; 
16% if 
registered for 
VAT 
Film 
allowance 
ICR 
An incentive for locally 
owned productions 
filming in South Africa; 
allows rebate up to 35% 
of qualifying expenditure 
on productions of a total 
budget ≥ R2.5 million; 
R10 m cap 
Increase 
investment in 
development of 
new business 
Can be 
manipulated, 
using to claim 
benefit for 
inefficient 
spending or 
cost (together 
with 
depreciation 
allowances) > 
investment; cap 
contains risk 
 Number of 
beneficiaries 
have dropped 
from peak of 
67 in 2003/04 
to 7 in 
2008/09 
319 
Research 
and 
Developme
nt 
Allowance 
ICR-ITC 
Increased expensing of 
assets and recurrent 
expenditures 
Tax allowance for: (a) 
purchase of equipment 
and buildings deducted 
at 50:30:20% (average 
33.3%); (b) current 
expenditure deducted at 
150%. 
Increase 
investment in 
development of 
new 
technologies, 
production 
techniques, etc. 
 
R&D credits can 
reduce 
entrepreneurial 
risk and 
encourage 
innovation and 
growth; difficult 
to monitor R&D 
investments 
relative to 
regular costs  
 No sunset 
clause 
 In 2008/09 
2 015 
companies 
benefitted, 
down from the 
2006/07 peak 
of 3 087 
219 
Learnership 
Allowance 
ICR 
Additional deductions 
for training 
Increase skill of 
workforce, 
reduce cost of 
expanded 
training 
Providing 
training via the 
tax system 
could lead to 
evasion; more 
acceptable if in 
form of 
expenditure 
subsidy 
 193 
Strategic 
Industrial 
Policy 
Incentive 
ICR 
100% deduction for 
equipment up to a 
treshhold 
Increase 
investment in 
critical areas 
Targets 
winners—
critical 
investment 
areas;  
 61 
Urban 
Developme
nt Zones 
ICR-AD 
Accelerated depreciation 
allowed for investments 
in qualified zones 
Increase 
investment in 
urban areas of 
SA 
Long-term 
effectiveness? 
Picking winners 
 85 
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TABLE 2. TAX INCENTIVES PERTAINING TO MANUFACTURING IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2009 
 
Incentive 
Type/ 
Category  
Code 
Nature of Incentive 
Reasons for 
Incentive 
Acceptability of 
Incentive 
Other comments / 
assessment(s) 
Cost 
estimate 
(08/09), 
[2009 R m] 
TOTAL 15 792 
 
In the remainder of this paper, we focus on those incentives aimed at increasing investment, 
employment and output and those that are employed through the corporate income tax 
system in South Africa. There are many additional incentives afforded producers and 
consumers through various taxes. The South African National Treasury (RSA, 2011: 189-192) 
produces an estimate of tax expenditures (including explicit tax incentives as well as more 
implicit tax reductions), which help to understand the nature and magnitude of the many 
incentives in the country. These incentives form part of a bigger group of incentives 
containing many expenditure subsidies designed to benefit particular sectors of the 
economy in one way or another. 
4. Analysis of the impacts of  tax incentives 
Many incentives are focused on increasing investment and employment and many 
specifically target the UCC in particular industries. Given the link between incentives and the 
UCC (and wages), one might argue that the first line of evaluation of a large group of 
incentives is to calculate the impact of incentives on the effective marginal tax rate on 
factors of production (METR). The METR measures the difference between net and gross 
rate of return due to specifics of tax policies within a country.7 A larger decrease in the METR 
would be expected to bring greater economic activity. A time series (or cross section) 
analysis of investment or employment as a function of the METR could be a useful incentive 
evaluation tool ex ante, estimated METRs under various incentives could be a useful way to 
inform the process of determining the “best” incentive. 
METRs are notoriously difficult to calculate as they should reflect very specific tax treatment 
of capital, including depreciation, carry forward/back of losses, and treatment of capital 
gains. Calculating METRs over time (or across countries) is that much more difficult due to 
changes in tax laws, regulations that affect “doing business”, etc. Incentives also often focus 
on a subset of industries (or regions) and attributing a net change in the price of capital as a 
result is somewhat subjective. 
As a result of these complications, there are few if any analyses of tax incentives that take 
this micro approach of measuring the impact of tax incentives on macro aggregates (growth, 
                                                          
7
 Regulatory policies may also be considered. METR analysis is derived from a standard model of profit 
maximization where the marginal investment is made such that the returns equal costs at the margin. 
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employment, etc.) using METRs.8 Such an analysis might be done ex post by regressing 
changes in macro aggregates such as employment, GDP, or investment against changes in 
the pre and post incentive METR over time. Alternatively, cross sectional analysis may make 
use of variation in METRs (overall or by sector) across countries as a determinant of growth 
in the same macro aggregates. This type of analysis would tend to be retrospective, although 
past experiences could be used to inform future planned incentives. Moreover, as pointed 
out by Klem and van Parys (2010: 3), a shortcoming is that METRs do not provide evidence 
on actual investment outcomes. An alternative would be to focus on growth, employment, 
etc. by sector over time, using the incentive as a “natural experiment.” The problem with 
both the above-mentioned econometric techniques is that many incentives are small relative 
to overall GDP, employment, etc. and therefore marginal effects associated with incentives 
can be difficult to pick up in a time series analysis. Very targeted incentives such as 
investment in certain regions of the country and in certain industries may simply be 
monitored with local data on employment and output. 
There are at least two alternative approaches that might be used to help evaluate the 
relative impact of incentives. If governments’ primary goal of incentives is to increase 
output, employment and growth, the most useful analysis of incentives is an ex ante one 
that compares the potential impacts of incentive X over incentive Y. Of course, such an 
analysis should also include a relative measure of acceptability – a “do the least harm” sort 
of approach to tax incentives. In support of this type of analysis, a simple social accounting 
matrix (SAM) or input-output multiplier analysis could be very effective in guiding 
government to the most cost-effective incentive. For want of a better label, we will refer to 
these as SAM analyses.9 
A SAM analysis provides insight into the following issues: per one rand of tax expenditure on 
a particular tax incentive, what is the potential payback country-wide? What industries are 
likely to be impacted by way of the multiplier? If the same incentive were considered for two 
different industries but could only be given to one industry, which would be more 
expansionary? 
                                                          
8
 There are however, a number of studies that estimate the METR at a point in time. For example, the FIAS 
studies for Zambia and Rwanda report METRs for those countries and also for South Africa, Malawi, Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe, Kenya and Uganda. These FIAS reports include METRs by major industries. 
9
 A SAM is different from an input–output matrix because it not only traces the income and expenditure flows 
of activities and commodities, but it also contains complete information on different institutional accounts, 
such as households and the government. SAM multipliers are an extension of the classic Leontief input-output 
model. While the Leontief model concentrates on inter-industry production linkages, SAM-based models also 
include consumption linkages. Consumption linkages are included by making institutions like households and 
the government “endogenous.” The SAM multiplier approach therefore makes use of information on 
household factor endowments and income distribution. SAM multiplier models have been used for a wide 
range of issues from trade policies and macroeconomic shocks to farm-nonfarm linkages. The SAM multiplier 
framework can be used to estimate the impacts of changes in any of the exogenous demand accounts in the 
model. Because we are treating households as endogenous in the model, this leaves three possible sources of 
demand stimulus: export demand, government spending, and investment demand. Exogenous changes in 
demand for these accounts are then transmitted to endogenous accounts, including producing sectors and 
households. In general SAM multipliers are larger than I-O or Supply-Use multipliers. 
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The SAM analysis is by no means clear-cut. First, an assumption would need to be made 
regarding the impact of the incentive on the target industry. For example, if accelerated 
depreciation in the manufacturing sector reduced the cost of capital by 25 percent, what is 
the impact on output? A standard production function could be used to estimate the 
elasticity of output with respect to those input prices. Once that estimate is made, the SAM 
entry for manufacturing output could be inflated to reflect the new induced level of output. 
In a standard multiplier framework, this increase will require increased inputs from a variety 
of industries, which can be determined from an I-O model. An example follows. Based on 
data from the 2008 SAM10 (Quantec Research, 2010), the motor vehicles, parts and 
accessories industry utilizes inputs from 35 industries of the 41 basic industries in our 
analysis. For example, this industry utilizes R 755 m of agriculture, forestry and fishing 
output, R 13 m from coal mining and R 2 601 m from other mining, among other industries. 
In total, it uses R 135 747 m to produce a total level of output for the industry of 
R 292 565 m. Compare this to another type of manufacturing—professional and scientific 
equipment, which utilizes inputs from 27 industries. This industry uses R 4 943 m of inputs 
from other industries to produce output of R 11 583 m. 
If the inputs were of similar relative magnitude, a one rand increase in motor vehicles, parts 
and accessories output coming from a tax incentive would be estimated to have a larger 
impact than a one rand increase in output of the professional and scientific equipment 
industry. This analysis does not weigh government goals such as protecting ‘home industries’ 
or the redistribution (among workers or regions of the country) that may be implicit when 
focusing incentives on one industry over another. The SAM analysis simply shows the 
potential difference in relative magnitude of various tax incentives. This analysis is therefore 
quite relevant to the policy discussion surrounding tax incentives. Ex post this analysis 
provides a metric for analyzing the outcomes of incentives, measured carefully by industry as 
the change in the level of output (and employment, which can be analyzed with a full I-O 
model analysis). 
One might also look to the impact of incentives on potential levels of output using multiplier 
analysis, which is in part developed from the SAM. The basic Leontief multipliers categorize 
the increased output in connected industries for an increase in output of any one industry. 
Using the relationships implicit in the SAM, the multipliers allow estimates of the increased 
economic activity across sectors that provide the input supplies to the sector in question. Ex 
ante, it is useful to gauge the potential impact across sectors for an incentive regime that is 
focused on one particular sector. The externalities that arise through the multiplier effects 
could enhance the value of the incentives or potentially be detrimental in extreme cases 
where competing industries are needed to supply the subsidized industry. 
                                                          
10
 Given that the latest SAM published by Statssa is for the year 2005 it was decided to use the Quantec 
Research SAM updated annually. The latest version is for 2008. Specific detail on the SAM is in Appendix B. 
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To engage a multiplier model, one needs to know the impact of a tax incentive on the output 
of the targeted industry. The impact is of course a function of the production function as 
well as supply and demand of factors of production and demand for the output and the 
relative reduction in the cost of capital from the incentive. For this preliminary analysis, we 
assume that the tax incentive lowers the cost of capital by 100 percent of the incentive and 
under assumptions of perfect competition, lowers the price of output by the share of capital 
in the total of capital (consumption of fixed capital) plus labor (from the SAM). For ease of 
analysis, we assume that the change in the level of output is equal to the change in the price 
(using total value of output from the SAM as our baseline). Any of these assumptions may be 
changed or made more specific to the industry. This analysis is explained in the examples 
below.  
Based on our analysis of current incentives in South Africa (Table 3)11, we find that the 
incentives are aimed at nine general sectors as follows (with amounts in R million): 
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing   20.39 
2. Mining and quarrying:      13.24 
3. Manufacturing:             14,687.84 
4. Electricity, gas and water supply:    16.67 
5. Construction:      89.89 
6. Wholesale/retail trade, repairs, hotels and restaurants:           266.82 
7. Transport, storage and communication:   59.85 
8. Financial:                    312.02 
9. Community, social and personal services:   59.95 
 
  
                                                          
11
 In Table 3 the listed sub-sectors were selected so as to approximate the sectors contained in the I-O table. 
Comments in brackets in the first column provide further information on the relationship between the standard 
industrial classification used in Table 3 and the sectors in the I-O table. 
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TABLE 3. ALLOCATION OF TAX SUBSIDIES IN SOUTH AFRICA BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 2008/09, R MILLION 
 
 
TYPE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY(1) 
  
SIC 
CODE 
REBATE ON 
IMPORT 
DUTIES IN 
MANUFAC-
TURE FOR 
HOME 
CONSUMP-
TION OR 
EXPORT(1) 
SPECIAL 
SMALL 
BUSINESS 
CORPORA-
TION TAX 
STRUCTURE(
2) 
FILM 
ALLOW-
ANCE(3) 
  
RESEARCH 
AND 
DEVELOP-
MENT 
ALLOW-
ANCE(4) 
LEARNER-
SHIP ALLOW-
ANCE(5) 
STRATEGIC 
INDUS-
TRIAL 
POLICY 
INCEN-
TIVE(6) 
URBAN 
DEVELOP-
MENT 
ZONES(7) 
R million 
MAJOR DIVISION 1: AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, 
FORESTRY AND FISHING 
  6.45     13.94     
Agriculture, hunting and related 
services 
11               
Commercial cereal crops  111               
Commercial other crops 111               
Commercial animal products 
112-
114 
              
Fishing 13               
MAJOR DIVISION 2: MINING AND QUARRYING   7.43     5.81     
Mining 21-25               
MAJOR DIVISION 3: MANUFACTURING   98.23   219 34.69 61 33.92 
Manufacture of food products, 
beverages and tobacco products 
30               
Production, processing and 
preservation of meat, fish, fruit, 
vegetables, oils and fats 
301               
Meat processing 3011               
Fish processing 3012               
Manufacture of grain mill products, 
starches and starch products and 
prepared animal feeds 
303               
Grain milling 3031               
Manufacture of beverages and other 
food products 
304-
305 
              
Beverages  and other food processing                 
Manufacture of textiles, clothing and 
leather goods 
31               
Textiles 
311-
312 
2 024             
Manufacture of wood and of products 
of wood and cork, except furniture; 
etc 
32               
Manufacture of wood and products of 
wood, except furniture; etc. (This 
covers the “wood” part of “Wood, 
Furniture, Misc”) 
321-
322 
              
Manufacture of paper and paper 
products (This covers the “paper” part 
of “Paper, printing”) 
323               
Publishing 324               
Printing and service activities related to 
printing (This, together with 
“publishing” covers the “printing” part 
of “Paper, printing”) 
325               
Manufacture of coke, refined 
petroleum products and nuclear fuel; 
manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products; manufacture of 
rubber and plastic products 
33               
Petroleum refineries/synthesisers 
(Petroleum products) 
332               
Chemicals & rubber 
334,33
5,337 
              
Manufacture of other non-metallic 
mineral products 
34               
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TABLE 3. ALLOCATION OF TAX SUBSIDIES IN SOUTH AFRICA BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 2008/09, R MILLION 
 
 
TYPE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY(1) 
  
SIC 
CODE 
REBATE ON 
IMPORT 
DUTIES IN 
MANUFAC-
TURE FOR 
HOME 
CONSUMP-
TION OR 
EXPORT(1) 
SPECIAL 
SMALL 
BUSINESS 
CORPORA-
TION TAX 
STRUCTURE(
2) 
FILM 
ALLOW-
ANCE(3) 
  
RESEARCH 
AND 
DEVELOP-
MENT 
ALLOW-
ANCE(4) 
LEARNER-
SHIP ALLOW-
ANCE(5) 
STRATEGIC 
INDUS-
TRIAL 
POLICY 
INCEN-
TIVE(6) 
URBAN 
DEVELOP-
MENT 
ZONES(7) 
R million 
Non-metallic mineral prod 
321-
342 
              
Manufacture of basic metals, 
fabricated metal products, machinery 
and equipment and of office, 
accounting and computing machinery 
35               
Basic Metals 
351-
353 
              
Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products (354 and 355) 
354-
355 
              
Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c 
356-
358 
              
(The two categories above cover “Fabr 
metals, Machinery”) 
                
Manufacture of electrical machinery 
and apparatus n.e.c. 
36               
Manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment and 
apparatus and of medical, precision 
and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks 
37               
Manufacture of transport equipment 38               
Manufacture of furniture; 
manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 
39               
Manufacture of light and heavy motor 
vehicles; parts and accessories [Not 
explicitly listed in I-O] 
381-
383 
12089             
Manufacture of furniture (This covers 
the “furniture” part of “Wood, 
Furniture, Misc”) 
391 128             
MAJOR DIVISION 4: ELECTRICITY, GAS AND 
WATER SUPPLY 
  0.25     1.66   15.06 
Electricity, gas, steam and hot water 
supply 
41               
Production, collection and distribution 
of electricity (Electricity) 
411               
Collection, purification and distribution 
of water (Water) 
42               
MAJOR DIVISION 5: CONSTRUCTION     14.26     19.4   3.23 
Construction 50   
            
MAJOR DIVISION 6: WHOLESALE AND RETAIL 
TRADE; REPAIR OF MOTOR VEHICLES, MOTOR 
CYCLES AND PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD 
GOODS; HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS 
  199.67     55.07   12.08 
Trade; repairs 61-63               
Hotels and restaurants 64               
MAJOR DIVISION 7: TRANSPORT, STORAGE AND 
COMMUNICATION 
  26.11     13.03   20.71 
Transport 71-74               
Post and telecommunications 
(Communication) 
75     319         
MAJOR DIVISION 8: FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIATION, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE 
AND BUSINESS SERVICES 
  282.93     29.09     
Finance and insurance 81-83               
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TABLE 3. ALLOCATION OF TAX SUBSIDIES IN SOUTH AFRICA BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 2008/09, R MILLION 
 
 
TYPE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY(1) 
  
SIC 
CODE 
REBATE ON 
IMPORT 
DUTIES IN 
MANUFAC-
TURE FOR 
HOME 
CONSUMP-
TION OR 
EXPORT(1) 
SPECIAL 
SMALL 
BUSINESS 
CORPORA-
TION TAX 
STRUCTURE(
2) 
FILM 
ALLOW-
ANCE(3) 
  
RESEARCH 
AND 
DEVELOP-
MENT 
ALLOW-
ANCE(4) 
LEARNER-
SHIP ALLOW-
ANCE(5) 
STRATEGIC 
INDUS-
TRIAL 
POLICY 
INCEN-
TIVE(6) 
URBAN 
DEVELOP-
MENT 
ZONES(7) 
R million 
Real estate, own 84               
MktRealEst + Business services 
85,86,
88 
              
MAJOR DIVISION 9: COMMUNITY, SOCIAL AND 
PERSONAL SERVICES  
        20.29     
Other private services 94   39.66           
Government services 91-93               
Direct purchases abroad by residents 
uncert
ain 
              
TOTAL VALUE OF INCENTIVE   14 241 674.99 319 219 192.98 61 85 
Source of data: Derived from National Treasury (2011: 181), based on assumptions about sector incidence of tax incentives as explained in 
notes below. 
Notes 
(1) The listed sub-sectors were selected so as to approximate the sectors contained in the I-O table. Comments in brackets in the first 
column pertain to the relationship between the standard industrial classification used in Table 3, the sectors in the I-O table and the 
assumed sector incidence of the tax incentives. 
(2)   The sectoral allocation of the benefit from the small business corporation tax structure was calculated as follows. SMMEs’ 
contribution to turnover of each sector for 2008 was used to calculate the value of their sectoral contribution. The resulting ratios 
were used to allocate SMMEs’ contribution to the net profit before tax and dividends for each sector. The resulting ratios were used to 
allocate the 2008/09 tax benefit – as calculated by National Treasury – per sector. Sectoral figures for turnover and net profit were 
obtained from StatsSA (2010a): Annual financial statistics, 2009. Statistical release P0021. Available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0021/P00212009.pdf. Accessed 26-07-2011. Tax benefit figures were obtained from 
National Treasury (2011: 181). 
(3)   The benefit from the film incentive has been allocated to “communication”, which forms part of the sector “transport, storage and 
telecommunication”. The amount is for 2007/08 (the latest available). Source of data: National Treasury (2011: 181). 
(4)   It is assumed that the entire research and development allowance benefit accrues to the manufacturing sector. 
(5)   It is assumed that the learnership allowance accrues to sector proportionately to the number of employees per sector (excluding 
government and community services) in the first quarter of 2008. Employment figures from StatsSA (2008) 
(6)   The Strategic Industrial Projects incentives (12G) allowed a 100% deduction on equipment up to a threshold and apply to 
manufacturing. 
(7)  The tax incentive pertaining to the upgrading of property in urban development zones (mainly office parks, residential and commercial 
(shops/shopping centres)) has been allocated to sectors of major presence in these zones and in proportion to their gross fixed capital 
formation in 2008. 
 
These sectors do not perfectly co-ordinate with our SAM, so we make an adjustment and 
assign the 9 affected sectors to more specific sectors as noted in Table 4 (based on details 
for the incentives where we have them). For each of the realigned nine sectors, we report 
the total value of incentives afforded the sector, the ratio of capital/(capital plus labor) and 
the change in the price of output (incentive * (K/K+L)). We assume that the change in output 
is equal to the change in price. We run this “shock” or increase in demand (by sector) 
through the multiplier model12 to determine the net impact on output of all industries (the 
targeted industry as well as the suppliers) and list that in the fifth column of Table 4. The 
final column of Table 4 reports the ratio: net impact/incentive. A value greater than one 
represents a net benefit over the cost of the incentive. 
                                                          
12
 See Breisinger, Clemens, Thomas and Thurlow (2010) for a detailed description on the calculation of SAM 
multipliers. 
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Table 4:  Multiplier analysis of current tax incentives in South Africa 
 
 
Sector 
Total 
incentives 
R m 
(K/K+L) 
Change in 
output 
Net effect 
(change in 
output over 
all industries 
due to 
multiplier)(1) 
R m 
Impact/ 
incentive 
Agriculture, 
forestry, fishing 
20.39 0.32240833 6.57390584 22.54756469 1.105814845 
Other mining 13.24 0.309260663 4.09461118 9.719302275 0.734086275 
Motor vehicles, 
parts, accessories 
14 687.84 0.385272239 5658.817004 15715.4299 1.069961948 
Electricity, gas, 
steam 
16.67 0.423091946 7.052942739 24.46867458 1.46782691 
Building 
construction 
89.89 0.129675936 11.65656993 44.45539092 0.494553242 
Wholesale trade 266.82 0.160463053 42.81475187 155.5968081 0.583152718 
Transport, storage 59.85 0.385507329 23.07261364 66.01533789 1.103013164 
Finance and 
insurance 
312.02 0.22166697 69.16452791 241.4649335 0.773876461 
Community, social 
and personal 
services 
59.95 0.046618379 2.794771795 9.747110226 0.162587327 
Note: (1)
 
The government sector, savings and investment as well as the rest of the world are exogenous to the 
model. 
While these estimates are relatively crude regarding the price and output effects, they 
illustrate the differences in incentives across sectors. The net impact to incentive ratios are 
large for incentives aimed at the agriculture, motor vehicles, electricity and transport sectors 
and relatively small impacts for trade, mining, finance and community services. These results 
come from the number and magnitude of the interactions among industries. If the 
government’s objective is to increase total output (and employment), this analysis provides 
some evidence that the impacts are very different depending on the incentivized industry. 
The limitations of SAM and multiplier analyses are well known. The increase in output is not 
countered by any resource constraints. In these models, additional inputs will be found, 
additional output will be consumed (implicitly). The relationships among industries are fixed 
– doubling the output of industry X will necessitate doubling the input from supporting 
industry Y. There are no economies of scale. The implicit production function for output is 
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the same across industries. We have made heroic assumptions regarding the impact of 
incentives on output to operationalize these models. For relatively small incentives, these 
limitations may be acceptable given the benefit of comparing “apples to apples” impacts of a 
set of incentives. At this stage, the SAM and multiplier analyses simply show the potential 
difference in relative magnitude of various tax incentives. These analyses are therefore quite 
relevant to the policy discussion surrounding tax incentives. Ex post these analyses provide a 
metric for analyzing the outcomes of incentives, measured carefully by industry as the 
change in the level of output (and employment, which can be analyzed with a full I-O model 
analysis). 
An alternative analytic approach to analyzing tax incentives is a computable general 
equilibrium model. A CGE model allows analysis of changes in tax rates to affect 
consumption and production while respecting assumed resource constraints. Many CGE 
models are not disaggregated enough to analyze relative small changes like tax incentives 
that reduce the UCC for particular industries and the complicated relationships within the 
model make it difficult to analyze relatively small changes. Such changes get “lost” in 
recalibration and may introduce non-convexities that result in non-convergence of new 
equilibrium positions. CGE models are very helpful for understanding the relative impact of 
large-scale “macro” tax incentives such as a change in the corporate tax rate, elimination of 
all exemptions, etc. 
Additional analyses could be done to consider the distributional implications of tax 
incentives – who wins and who loses? The “cost” of the tax incentive in the short run is a 
matter of debate. If a government operated under a balanced budget of sorts, the tax 
incentive would have to be financed through higher other taxes (perhaps general funds) or 
via lower expenditures. The resulting net fiscal burden could be regressive or progressive. It 
would also be useful to analyze the subsidy side of the incentives game. The same tools of 
public finance can be used to demonstrate the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of using 
direct subsidies (versus tax expenditures) to incentivize particular industries. In some 
countries, expenditure subsidies may be more politically acceptable in that they are seen as 
a short-term expenditure that can be eliminated in the future. Subsidies should also reach 
the regular expenditure budget of governments and thereby be more transparent than tax 
incentives. 
5. Alternatives 
What are the alternatives to tax incentives? The most common approach is to consider the 
corporate tax reduction which an abolishment of all investment tax incentives would make 
possible. This macro tax incentive could be analyzed and compared to, for example, the cost 
of those listed in Table 3. A wide-scale measure such as reduction in the corporate income 
tax rate is difficult to analyze without a full CGE approach. However, using a very similar 
approach to that of the multiplier analysis above, we can offer some intuition regarding the 
potential impact of a general corporate tax reduction. We cannot at this stage say anything 
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about the welfare or distributional effects of a general tax reduction versus specific tax 
incentives. 
Using our multiplier model, we assume once again that a decrease in the corporate tax rate 
will reduce the user cost of capital in line with capital’s share of factor inputs in each sector. 
Using the same methodology as above, we impose a corporate tax reduction “shock” equal 
to the total value of incentives investigated in Table 4 (R 15 526.7 million). We allocated a 
share to each sector based on the output of the sector as a share of total output according 
to the SAM we use. We use sectors 1-42 in our matrix. The impact of such a change induced 
by an overall corporate tax decrease is an increase in output of R 56 017 million—which 
yields a benefit (net increase in output) to cost (total cost of incentive) of 3.6. This is much 
larger than any of the targeted incentives listed above. We understand that not all sectors 
would actually benefit from a corporate tax reduction (those in the non-profit sector or 
industries with large numbers of small and start-up companies)—however, the overall 
magnitude of impact from a general corporate tax reduction certainly seems to warrant 
more attention as a potential replacement for the piecemeal approach of targeted 
incentives. 
Another approach to analysis of tax incentives is to consider the opportunity cost of tax 
incentives with reference to other government programmes which could be financed, 
particularly of a pro-poor nature.  
Another alternative to tax incentives is cooperation among countries. Such cooperation is 
notoriously difficult but interest in cooperation has grown as competition has become more 
and more fierce. Cooperation can be of many forms. 
It is also possible for countries to address the incentive issue through a general 
rationalization of tax systems. If the tax expenditures associated with tax incentives were 
used to provide across-the-board reductions in tax rates, countries may be able to effectively 
and rationally attract investment. In such cases, the market would ‘pick the winners’ instead 
of government. Of course this leaves out targeted incentives where government wants to 
pick winners. In addition, countries could engage in more rigorous enforcement of rational 
transfer pricing, tax shelter laws and regulations, etc.  
6. Conclusion 
Tax expenditures are likely to continue to be part of development policy in South Africa and 
around the world. There is mixed evidence of the impact of targeted incentives. In this 
paper, we attempt to shed more light on how we might evaluate tax incentives to assist 
policy makers’ decisions regarding particular incentives. We categorize tax incentives by 
“type” and provide a context for developing a hierarchy of tax incentives that would be 
expected to have more or less economics impacts (“good” and “bad”). We also provide some 
early empirical analysis of the potential impacts of various targeted incentives, using data on 
incentives that are currently in use in South Africa. 
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Specifically, preliminary analysis demonstrates that relatively simple tools such as social 
accounting matrices and Leontief multipliers can provide policy makers a means to evaluate 
the relative value of incentives with respect to their output effects. With these models, we 
provide preliminary evidence of the superior impact of a general tax incentive such as a 
reduced corporate tax rate on output. Future research will focus on the development of a 
CGE model that can provide more detailed analysis of such a large scale change. We also 
plan to evaluate the expected impact of subsidies versus tax incentives in South Africa. 
What remains is identifying an ex post evaluation of tax incentives. Using the estimates of 
expected changes in output (from the multiplier analysis and in the future from CGE 
analysis), we will attempt to estimate before and after output changes.  
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APPENDIX A 
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE CALCULATION OF THE SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF SOUTH 
AFRICAN INDUSTRIAL TAX INCENTIVES, 2008/09 
Name of 
incentive 
Nature of Incentive 
Assumptions underlying calculation 
of sectoral allocation
(1}
 
Cost (08/09), 
[2009 prices] 
Rebate on 
import duties 
in manufac-
ture for home 
consumption 
or export  
Partial rebate or a rebate of the full 
duty on certain specified imported 
goods 
Entire benefit accrues to 
manufacturing. 
14 241 
Special small 
business 
corporation 
tax structure 
Reduced rate of taxation and special 
tax regime - presumptive tax, 
enhanced depreciation regime, capital 
gains tax relief, relief from skills 
development levy, graduated scale: 
 Tax threshold: R 59 750 
 Taxable income R 59 751 - R300 000: 
10% of amount > R 59 750 
Taxable income ≥R 300 001: R24 025 
(plus 28% of amount > R300 000) 
In the absence of data on SME tax 
benefits per sector, the tax benefit 
accruing to SMEs in the 
manufacturing sector was assumed 
to be proportional to their sectoral 
turnover. 2008 data were used to 
allocate the 2008/09 tax incentive.  
[Data obtained from StatsSA survey 
of businesses not registered for 
VAT and income tax (StatsSA, 
2010a)] 
675 
Film 
allowance 
An incentive for locally owned 
productions filming in South Africa; 
allows rebate up to 35% of qualifying 
expenditure on productions of a total 
budget ≥ R2.5 million; R10 m cap 
The entire tax benefit was assumed 
to accrue to the subsector 
“communication”, which is part of 
“transport, storage and 
telecommunication”. 
319 
Research and 
Development 
Allowance 
Increased expensing of assets and 
recurrent expenditures 
Tax allowance for: (a) purchase of 
equipment and buildings deducted at 
50:30:20% (average 33.3%); (b) current 
expenditure deducted at 150%. 
The entire tax benefit was assumed 
to accrue to manufacturing. 
219 
Learnership 
Allowance 
 
Additional deductions for training to 
increase skill of workforce & reduce 
cost of expanded training 
 
Benefit assumed accrued to 
economic sectors proportional to 
number of employees (excluding 
government and community 
services), using employment data 
for the first quarter of 2008. 
193 
Strategic 
Industrial 
Policy 
Incentive 
100% deduction for equipment up to a 
threshold  
The entire tax benefit was assumed 
to accrue to manufacturing. 
61 
Urban 
Development 
Zones 
 
Accelerated depreciation allowed for 
investments in qualified zones 
The benefit was allocated to 
sectors of major presence in these 
zones, in proportion to gross fixed 
capital formation in 2008, namely 
manufacturing, electricity, gas and 
water, construction, trade, 
transport and storage. 
85 
Note:  (1) This column contains assumptions required in order to derive, from published figures (National 
Treasury, 2011: 181), an estimate of the portion of incentives attributed to the different economic sectors. 
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Appendix B 
The 2008 Quantec RSA Social Accounting Matrix 
One way of depicting the economy is the well-known circular flow diagram which captures 
all transfers and real transactions between sectors and institutions. Productive activities 
purchase land, labour and capital inputs from the factor markets, and intermediate inputs 
from commodity markets, and use these to produce goods and services. These are 
supplemented by imports (M) and then sold through commodity markets to households (C), 
the government (G), investors (I), and foreigners (E). In the circular flow diagram, each 
institution's expenditure becomes another institution's income. In other words, all income 
and expenditure flows are accounted for, and there are no leakages from the system.  
 
A social accounting matrix (SAM) is also a representation of the economy. More specifically, 
it is an accounting framework that assigns numbers to the incomes and expenditures in the 
circular flow diagram. A SAM is laid out as a square matrix in which each row and column is 
called an "account." Figure A1 shows the 2008 Macro SAM of South Africa. Each cell in the 
matrix represents, by convention, a flow of funds from a column account to a row account. 
For example, the circular flow diagram shows private consumption spending as a flow of 
funds from households to commodity markets. In the SAM, it is entered in the household 
column and commodity row. The underlying principle of double-entry accounting requires 
that, for each account in the SAM, total revenue equals total expenditure. This means that 
an account's row and column totals must be equal.  
 
The SAM distinguishes between "activities" and "commodities". Activities are the entities 
that produce goods and services, and commodities are those goods and services produced 
by activities. They are separated because sometimes an activity produces more than one 
kind of commodity (by-products). Similarly, commodities can be produced by more than one 
kind of activity. The values in the activity accounts are usually measured in producer prices. 
 
Activities produce goods and services by combining the factors of production with 
intermediate inputs. This is shown in the activity column of the SAM, where activities pay 
factors the wages, rents and profits they generate during the production process (that is, 
value-added). This is a payment from activities to factors, and so the value-added entry in 
the SAM appears in the activity column and the factor row. Similarly, intermediate demand 
is a payment from activities to commodities. Adding together value-added and intermediate 
demand gives gross output. The information on production technologies contained in the 
activity column is the input part of a typical "input-output table", or factor and intermediate 
inputs per unit of output. 
 
Commodities are either supplied domestically or imported. Indirect sales taxes and import 
tariffs are paid on these commodities. This means that the values in the commodity accounts 
are measured at market prices. A number of economic entities purchase commodities. 
Activities buy commodities to be used as intermediate inputs for production. Final demand 
for commodities consists of household consumption spending, government consumption, or 
recurrent expenditure, gross capital formation or investment, and export demand. All of 
these sources of demand make up the commodity row. On their own, the commodity row 
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and column accounts are sometimes referred to as a "supply–use table", or the total supply 
of commodities and their different kinds of uses or demands. 
 
The Macro SAM in Figure A1 shows only single activity and commodity rows and columns. 
The Macro SAM is disaggregated into 49 activities producing 49 commodities to form the 
Micro SAM used in this paper. These categories are:  Agriculture, forestry & fishing; Coal 
mining; Gold & uranium ore mining ; Other mining; Food; Beverages & tobacco; Textiles; 
Wearing apparel; Leather & leather products; Footwear; Wood & wood products; Paper & 
paper products; Printing, publishing & recorded media; Coke & refined petroleum products; 
Basic chemicals; Other chemicals & man-made fibres; Rubber products; Plastic products; 
Glass & glass products; Non-metallic minerals; Basic iron & steel; Basic non-ferrous metals; 
Metal products excluding machinery; Machinery & equipment; Electrical machinery; 
Television, radio & communication equipment; Professional & scientific equipment; Motor 
vehicles, parts & accessories; Other transport equipment; Furniture; Other industries; 
Electricity, gas & steam; Water supply; Building construction; Wholesale & retail trade; 
Catering & accommodation services; Transport & storage; Communication; Finance & 
insurance; Business services; Medical, dental & other health & veterinary services; 
Community, social & personal services; Government: General administration; Government: 
Defence; Government: Law and order; Government: Education; Government: Health; 
Government: Social; Government: Economic. 
 
A SAM is different from an input–output matrix because it not only traces the income and 
expenditure flows of activities and commodities, but it also contains complete information 
on different institutional accounts, such as households and the government. Households are 
usually the ultimate owners of the factors of production, and so they receive the incomes 
earned by factors during the production process. They also receive transfer payments from 
the government and from the rest of the world. Households then pay taxes directly to the 
government and purchase commodities. 
 
The government receives transfer payments from the rest of the world. This is added to all of 
the different tax incomes to determine total government revenues. The government uses 
these revenues to pay for recurrent consumption spending and transfers to households. The 
difference between total revenues and expenditures is the fiscal surplus or deficit. 
 
According to the ex post accounting identity, investment or gross capital formation, which 
includes changes in stocks or inventories, must equal total savings. The difference between 
total domestic savings and total investment demand is total capital inflows from abroad, or 
what is called the current account balance. This is also equal to the difference between 
foreign exchange receipts and expenditures. 
 
Labour is disaggregated into four categories: semi- and unskilled, skilled, highly skilled and 
informal. Households are disaggregated into 14 categories using percentiles of the income 
spectrum. The rest of the world is disaggregated into 12 categories: Africa excluding SADC; 
SADC; NAFTA; South and Central America; Europe excluding EU; European Union; Eastern 
Asia; South-central Asia; South-Eastern Asia; Western Asia; Oceania and Not allocated. 
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Figure A1. Macro SAM(1) for South Africa, 2008, Rm  
 
 
(1) Source: © - Quantec Research (Pty) Ltd. 
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